Dr. Su Rong obtained his Bachelor of Engineering degree from University of Science and Technology of China in 1997, and Master of Applied Science degree and PhD degree from University of Toronto in 2000 and 2004, respectively. He was affiliated with University of Waterloo and Technical University of Eindhoven before he joined the School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at Nanyang Technological University in 2010. Dr. Su's research interests include multi-agent systems, discrete-event system theory, model-based fault diagnosis, control and optimisation for complex systems with applications in flexible manufacturing, intelligent transportation, human-robot interface, power management and green buildings. In the aforementioned areas he has more than 180 journal and conference publications and 2 granted US/Singapore patents, and has been involved in several projects sponsored by Singapore National Research Foundation (NRF), Singapore Agency of Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), Singapore Ministry of Education (MoE), Singapore Civil Aviation Authority (CAAS) and Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB). Dr. Su is a senior member of IEEE, and an associate editor for Automatica, Journal of Discrete Event Dynamic Systems: Theory and Applications, and Journal of Control and Decision. He is also the Chair of the Technical Committee on Smart Cities in the IEEE Control Systems Society.

One of the major challenges about cyber physical systems is how to protect system integrity from cyber attacks. There has been a large number of different types of attacks discussed in the literature. In this talk I will discuss two types of attacks in the discrete-event system framework. I will first introduce a sensor attack model, where an attacker can arbitrarily alter sensor readings after intercepting them from a target system, aiming to trick a given supervisor to issue improper control commands, which can drive the system to an undesirable state. We consider the cyber attack problem from an attacker point of view, and formulate an attack-with-bounded-sensor-reading-alterations (ABSRA) problem. We then show that the supremal (or least restrictive) ABSRA exists and can be computed, as long as the plant model and the supervisor model are regular, i.e., representable by finite-state automata. Upon the synthesis of the supremal ABSRA, we present a synthesis algorithm, which computes asupervisor that is ABSRA-robust in the sense that any ABSRA will either be detectable or not lead the system to undesirable behaviours. Next, I will introduce an actuator attack model and show that the supremal sensor attack model exists, which can be computed via a language-based strategy.